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Feminism, Law, and Bioethics 
ABSTRACT. Feminist legal theory provides a healthy skepticism toward legal 
doctrine and insists that we reexamine even formally gender-neutral rules to 
uncover problematic assumptions behind them. The article first outlines feminist 
legal theory from the perspectives of liberal, cultural, and radical feminism. 
Examples of how each theory influences legal practice, case law, and legislation 
are highlighted. Each perspective is then applied to a contempora.;: bioethical 
issue, egg donation. Following a brief discussion of the common themes shared 
by feminist jurisprudence, the article incorporates a narrative reflecting on the 
integration of the common feminist themes in the context of the passage of the 
Maryland Health Care Decisions Act. The article concludes thar gender does 
matter and that an understanding of feminist legal theory and practice will 
enrich the analysis of contemporary bioethical issues. 
FEMINISM SEEKS TO UNDERSTAN"TI AND TO VAL"C.t. the expe-riences, insights, and logic of women's lives. Feminisr legal theory provides a healthy skepticism toward traditional legal doctrine and 
insists that we reexamine even formally gender-neutral rules to uncover 
the problematic assumptions behind them. It also challenges the traGi-
tiona! split between private and public spheres, as well as rile way in 
which traditional conceptions of justice translate into public policy. 
Finally, feminist perspectives tend to value the importance of narrative, 
thereby challengmg the traditionally "objective" approach ro case law 
reporting. Stories put issues in context, just as case studies do for eiliicists 
and health care providers, and hence help us to challenge the assumptions 
we make about individuals and the role of the law in their li•.!es. 
These important themes are reflected in a diversity of feminist legal 
theories. 1 In this article, I outline the major feminist theories in order to 
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pur the application of feminist jurisprudence in a broader analytical 
framework. Hopefully, this framework will help to clarify the societal 
implications of the legal rules, processes, and practices that shape our 
responses to bioethical challenges. I illustrate the differences among 
these theories by applying them to a contemporary bioethical issue, egg 
donation. I then reflect on the common themes shared by various femi-
nist theories by providing a narrative describing how feminist thought 
influenced recent Maryland legislation on health care decision making. 
FEMINIST THEORY, JURISPRUDENCE. AND PRACTICE 
Liberal Feminism 
Liberal feminism is based on a belief in formal gender equality, par-
ticularly in the economic and political arenas (see, e.g., Ginsburg 1971, 
1975; Williams 1982). Since women possess the same capabilities as 
men, liberal feminists claim that women should be entitled to equal 
rights, equal employment opportunities, and equal pay.· Under this 
equality model, gender classifications are ro be challenged because they 
reflect and reinforce stereotypes that fail ro treat men and women as 
individuals. Liberal feminism draws heavily on the notions of rationali-
ty, individual autonomy, and choice that are central to liberal political 
theory. Thus, liberal feminists have focused primarily on the goals of 
eliminating state-imposed gender distinctions and of preventing the state 
from limiting individual choice. 
One significant source of law for liberal feminist theory ~ the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
which provides that no state shall deny to any. person, equal protection 
of the law. Simply put, similarly situated persons, namely men. and 
women, should be treated equally. Advocates for women's equality first 
tried, unsuccessfully, to utilize the Equal Protection Clause almost 125 
years ago w6en a woman was refused the right to practice law (Bradwell 
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 21 L.Ed. 442 (1872); In re Goodell, 
39 Wis. 232 (1875)), and then again at the rum of the century to chal-
lenge "protective" labor laws that limited the number ol hours women 
could work (Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)). In both types of 
cases, the court justified treating women differently from men based on 
women's physical and mental attributes, their "nature," and their sup-
posed need to be protected. 
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It was not until the early 1970s that tenets of liberal feminism began 
to take hold in the courts. The first case defending women's rights on lib-
eral feminist grounds invalidated a statutory preference for men over 
women in the appointment of estate administrators (Reed v. Reed, 404 
U.S. 71 (1971)). Many cases soon followed that challenged the constitu-
tionality of laws that treated men and women differenrly and that advo-
cated applying a higher standard of scrutiny to such cases. Ironically, 
many of the successful test cases were brought by men who claimed that 
various laws were unfair and unconsrirurional-for instance, laws 
requiring men to meet more stringent tests of spousal dependency in 
order to claim government benefits (Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677 (1973)), laws establishing a higher legal drinking age for men (Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)), and laws rendering men ineligible for 
alimony (Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)). 
Concurrently, activists and the courts began ro ciiscover additional 
protections in the Equal Pay Act of 1963 129 U.S.C.-~. §§206{d), 216-
217), which mandated that employers pay women the same wages as 
men holding the same jobs, and in Title VII of the Civil Rights Ac: of 
1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §2000e et seq.), which bannec sex discrimination in 
employment and labor organizations. By 1971, the Supreme Court 
upheld a finding of sex discrimination under Title Vll when an employ-
er refused to hire mothers but not fathers with preschool children 
(Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 1971)). 
Perhaps the biggest challenge for liberal feminists has involved issues 
that relate to pregnancy and childbearing. In 19-4, the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a comprehensive stare disability insurance 
plan that excluded benefits for pregnancy ( Geduldig t-·. Aiello, 417 U.S. 
484 (1974)) and, in 1976, held that an employer ·was not in violation of 
Title VII when medical benefits did not include COStS associated ·with 
pregnancy (General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (19-6)). 
Following these two rulings, feminists lobbied Congress to pass the 
PregnanH Discrimination Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C.A. 52000e(k)), which 
specifically states that sex discrimination under Title vn includes dis-
tinctions based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. 
The Supreme Court has since held that an emplo::er's feral-protection 
policy that excluded fertile women from cerrain jobs constituted sex dis-
crimination under Title VII (International Union, UAW v. johnson 
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991)), bur it has nor issued any similar 
rulings based on a constitutional analysis. 
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Although liberal feminism has been quite successful in expanding 
political and economic opportUnities available to white, middle class 
women, it has been criticized for ignoring the constraints of race and 
class and for adopting an assimilation model that benefits women only 
to the extent that they act like men. In fact, some critics of "formal 
equality" argue that affirmative action and certain "special" accommo-
dations to women, such as childrearing leave, special child custody stan-
dards, and comparable worth schemes for job classifications, are neces-
sary to counteract unfairness that results from what appear to be gender-
neutral rules (see, e.g., Littleton 1987; Law 1984). Many liberal femi-
nists continue to maintain, howeve1; that women will not ultimately ben-
efit from strategies that promote special treatment and reinforce gender 
differences (see, e.g., Williams 1982). 
Cultural Feminism 
While liberal feminism basically emphasizes the essential sameness of 
men and women, cultural or relational feminism focuses on their differ-
ences (see, e.g., Bender 1990; West 1988). Cultural feminism is ground-
ed in the work of Carol Gilligan (1982) and other contemporary psy-
chologists who suggest that men and women speak in a "different 
voice." These theorists argue that men, on average, tend to analyze prob-
lems in terms of abstract rules and competing rights and to emphasize 
the importance of autonomy. Women, by contrast, tend to be more con-
textual in their analysis of problems and to place more emphasis on pre-
serving personal relationships. 
Cultural feminists argue that many traditional legal d~ctrines and 
practices are based on "masculine" values of autonomy and-abstraction 
and fail to value the positive "feminine" concerns of responsibility, rela-
tionship, and essential connectedness experienced, for example, in the 
modfer-child relationship. They have sought to balance the traditional 
legal emphasis on male values by promoting a jurisprudential theory that 
espouses a female ethic of care rather than a morality of rights. For 
example, cultural feminists have suggested that the law look for mecha-
nisms to resolve disputes that would provide alternatives to the tradi-
tional adversary paradigm (Menkel-Meadow 1983). Feminist models of 
mediation have also been proposed to address bioethical disputes about 
medical decision making among family members and health care profes-
sionals. It is believed, for example, that ethics committees are better 
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equipped than the adversarial court system to foster and maintain fami-
ly and physician-patient relationships. Similarly, cultural feminists have 
suggested that courts apply a feminist ethic of care when determining 
standards of negligence in order to recognize a duty to rescue strangers 
where none currently exists {Bender 1988}. In order to promote and sup-
port a caring society, they argue, why should health care professionals 
not have a legal duty to have to srop by the side of the road and provide 
medical assistance to a person injured in an automobile accident? 
Cultural feminists also have challenged the categorization of physician-
assisted suicide as "a criminal act of murder," rather than as "an act of 
caring" that would alleviate pain and suffering {Bender 1992). 
Cultural feminism may also question current standards of proper 
informed consent. Currently, standards of informed consem: require the 
disclosure of information that a "reasonable person"" would want to 
know in order to make an informed decision. However; if men and 
women think and speak in "different voices," there may be no one com-
mon conception of a reasonable person. Indeed, current conceptions of 
such a person tend to reflect a masculine notion oi reasonability, and 
cultural feminists urge that we expand this notion to indude women's 
values. 
Radical Feminism 
Radical or dominance feminism, like cultural feminism, arose in large 
part as a response to the perceived inadequacies in liberal ieminist theo-
ry. Catherine MacKinnon, the major proponent of dominance theory, 
argues with cultural feminists that men and women are di...•=ferent; how-
ever, unlike cultural feminists, she argues that these differences hrgely 
reflect the fact that in society women are subordinate a-nd men are dom-
inant (Mac~innon 1987; see also Littleton 1989). According to domi-
nance theorists, it is this inequality in power to which the law must 
respond. Moreover, since the primary source of women's oppression is 
private power, particularly the threat of sexual violence, r.he solution is 
not-as the liberal feminists often claim-less State itltervention, but 
more. Radical feminists argue, for example, that the legal system should 
abandon its traditional "hands-off" attitude toward violence in the fam-
ily and move more aggressively to protect women from the abusive 
power of men in the private sphere. These argumenrs have produced 
concrete changes in some state laws that have made it easier for the 
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police to intervene in domestic violence disputes and for criminal law to 
recognize that rape is a violent act that can occur within the marital rela-
tionship. 
MacKinnon (1979) was also instrumental in persuading lawmakers to 
recognize that sexual harassment in the work place is sex discrimination, 
and not just a private matter berween individuals. Within the last 
decade, the evolution of sexual harassment as a legal claim has signifi-
cantly changed the problematic dynamics of many historically male-
dominated professions, including law and medicine. (Of course, the 
nursing profession has, for a long time, been all too aware of the nega-
tive dynamics that result from male domination.) 
Whereas liberal feminists have concentrated primarily on expanding 
women's choices and cultural feminists have concentrated on reforming 
legal rules to reflect women's real experiences and to affirm women's val-
ues, radical feminists have argued that law should address the harms to 
women that arise from conduct of other private actors, particularly men 
and particularly with respect to sex and violence. 
Postmodern Feminism 
Postmodern feminism is a more recent addition to feminist discourse. 
This perspective rejects the assumptions and generalizations at the core 
of the preceding feminist theories. According to postmodern feminists, 
no objective reality can describe the "essential" woman; consequently, 
such feminists embrace the particular "situated" realities of all individ-
ual women. Postmodernists encourage feminists to consider real life 
experiences influenced by each woman's race, class, age, and sexual ori-
entation (see Frug 1992; Bartlett 1994, pp. 13-18; Cain 199<):; pp. 838-
41 ). Critical legal feminist scholars have incorporated themes of post-
modernism by rejecting abstract universal theory and embracing the 
need f~r a social policy that provides practical and just solutions to real 
life problems (see, e.g., Rhode 1990; Radin 1990). 
APPLYING DIFFERENT FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES: EGG DONATION2 
How might the three major feminist theories enrich the debate over 
contemporary issues in bioethics and public policy? Here I shall consid-
er the issue of egg "donation," a process more accurately described as 
the harvesting of eggs from one woman, usually with compensation, by 
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an IVF clinic for use by a contracting woman and/or couple who desires 
the birth of a baby. How might each feminist theory help us to frame and 
answer the questions raised by the process? 
The liberal feminist would frame the issue in terms of the similarities 
and differences in the roles men and women face in such situations. For 
instance, although men do not donate or sell eggs, they do donate and 
sell sperm; since men can sell sperm and liberal feminists want to pro-
mote choice, perhaps women should be able to sell their reproductive 
material as well. If we allow a marker for sperm, why not allow a mar-
ket for eggs? On the other hand, liberal feminists will call our attention 
to the extent to which egg and sperm donation are not truly analogous. 
For example, egg retrieval is much more complex, risky, and time-con-
suming than is sperm donation. Thus, proper compensation would be 
greater for the sale of eggs, but not so great as to preclude economic 
arrangements between the infertile and those who want to sell their eggs. 
As part of promoting "procreative liberty," however, the liberal feminist 
will argue that it is important to have an informed consent process in 
place that clearly spells out the benefits and risks of the procedure both 
to the woman supplying the eggs and to the woman receiving them, as 
well as the intent of all parries. For example, the woman who agrees to 
have her eggs extracted should have no expectation of maternal rights. 
and, absent a prior rdationship, no involvement with the intended moth-
er or any future child. Such policies would closely parallel those cur-
rently in place for sperm donation. Given full disclosure and a fair and 
reasonable compensation scheme, liberal feminists would support a pub-
lic policy that recognizes egg donation as a choice for women. 
In contrast, cultural" feminists might frame the issue by asking what 
impact egg donation would have on family relationships, furu.~;._e connec-
tions, and the role of motherhood. If egg donation is viewed as a para-
digm in which altruistic women help infertile women to become moth-
ers, the cultural feminist might support it in the context of a noncom-
mercial 5.rrangement. Egg donation would be characterized as a caring 
gesture, involving an open arrangement in which the relationship among 
both women and any offspring could continue to grow. On the other 
hand, cultural feminists are not likely ro support a market for women's 
eggs by IVF clinics. Such a scheme might be viewed as commodifying 
motherhood and undermining caring relationships. 
Radical feminists, finally, would be very suspicious of egg donation. 
Whereas artificial insemination can be done with a turkey baster, egg 
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donation and IVF procedures require a high level of reproductive tech-
nology. Radical feminists argue that this technology, which is controlled 
by the male-dominated medical establishment, has historically tended to 
manipulate women's reproductive lives. Thus, women who participate in 
these procedures will be subject to the subordination of male power and 
the medical hierarchy. Furthermore, radical feminists worry about the 
potential for exploitation that such arrangements bring with them. First, 
poor women will be vulnerable to exploiration, undergoing invasive pro-
cedures and selling their eggs because they need the money. Second, 
infertile women seeking eggs, while they tend to be wealthier, will be 
exploited by society's pressure to reproduce. At the same time, the male-
dominated medical establishment and any middlemen, including 
lawyers, will financially profit from the arrangement. Finally, even in the 
noncommercial setting, radical feminists might argue that egg donation 
requires women to use other women ro perpetuate a sex stereotype that 
only values women in the context of reproductive capacities. Thus, egg 
donation in any context may result in the exploitation of women. 
APPLYING COMMON FEMINIST THEMES: 
THE MARYLAND HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT 
In spite of these different perspectives, there are a number of themes, 
as noted earlier, that unite feminist theory. First, gender does matter. All 
feminists ask what impact a rule, practice, or policy will have on gender 
and, more specifically, on the lives of women from diverse backgrounds 
and experiences. Second, all feminist legal theory questions the objectiv-
ity of legal doctrine and its seeming gender neutrality, since.._ laws and 
policies that are gender neutral on their face may not be so iri result or 
application. Third, it reevaluates the miditional distinctiorr between 
public and private spheres and the view that the law should respond only 
to public issues. To make these various considerations come to life, fem-
inists value the importance of the narrative to give voice and context to 
the personal experiences of women. 
The themes shared by feminist theories may be integrated to enrich 
the analysis of important bioethical and public policy issues. Let me 
( 
share my narrative and perspective on how this integration, quite unde-
liberately, enhanced the development of a major piece of recent health 
care legislation, the Maryland Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 (Md. 
Code Ann., Health-Gen. §§5-601 to 618 {1994)).3 
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By the early 1990s, the Cruzan decision (Cruzan v. Director, Mo. 
Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)) caused many states, including 
Maryland, to recognize the need for a comprehensive legislative 
approach to the termination of life-sustaining medical treatment. Prior 
to this rime, Maryland had very little judicial guidance in rhe area-only 
advisory opinions from the Attorney General's Office and a narrowly 
drafted living will statute that was limited to those v.rith a terminal con-
dition. In addition, Maryland had no durable power of attorney statute 
that extended to health care decisions, and its surrogate consent statute 
did not specifically address the termination of life-sustaining medical 
treatment. 
By March 1992, a drafting committee was formed under the auspices 
of the Maryland Conference of Circuit Judges to consider comprehen-
sive legislation that would address medical decision making for compe-
tent and incompetent persons, advanced direcrives, surrogate/family 
decision making, emergency treatment and other health care decisions 
by physicians, and judicial standards under Maryland guardianship law. 
The committee was chaired by Judge John Carroll Byrnes, Circuit Coun 
of Baltimore City, and included four additional members from the Office 
of the Attorney General, the Health Law section oi me Maryland Bar, 
the Maryland Disability Law Center, and the University of Maryland 
School of Medicine. It is worth noting that this five-member committee 
was all white and all male. 
Within a few months the committee circulated dram of its proposed 
legislation for public comment to a limited number of "interested par-
ties." My first reaction was that while the committee did attempt to 
address a number of issues, the result was a very lengthy, detailed, and 
complex document. It seemed to cover every possible situation, and fur 
every grant of authority, there seemed to be a cavea~ and then an excep-
tion to each caveat (Hoffmann 1994, p. 1086). In addition to my con-
cern with the legalistic nature of the proposal, I noticed cenain obvious 
problems that h!d disturbing gender implications. First, the living will 
provisions of the proposal still maintained the pregnancy clause from 
Maryland's 1985 living will stature, which stipulated that a living will 
would not be honored during a woman's pregnancy. Thus,•a pregnant 
woman, regardless of the viability of the fetus she carried, would have 
fewer rights to terminate life support than similarly situated men and 
nonpregnant women. Such a view is problematic from the perspective of 
[ 77 ] 
KENNEDY INSTIThTI OF ETHICS JOURNAL • MARCH !996 
each of the feminist theories. Liberal feminisrs would argue that such a 
pregnancy clause would violate the constitutional rights of pregnant 
women and would make bad public policy. Cultural feminists might 
argue that the state should not impose irs judgment on that of the preg-
nant woman who is the one best equipped to evaluate her needs in the 
context of her relationships. Radical feminists would object to a law that 
subordinates pregnant women to the state in the determination of what 
is best for her and her fetus. In spire of such concerns, members of the 
drafting committee believed that maintaining the pregnancy clause 
might prove to be a nonnegotiable issue with the Catholic Conference 
and ultimately with the Maryland Legislature. 
A second problem with the proposal was its inclusion of provisions 
that appeared gender neutral on their face but proved nor to be on clos-
er inspection. The proposal declared that the state has an interest in 
ensuring that the welfare of minor children not be impaired as a result 
of a competent individual's decision to withhold or withdraw life-sus-
taining procedures (Hoffmann 1994, pp. 1074-75). Thus, although the 
proposal declared that a competent individual has a right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment, it stated that if the individual was the sole 
provider of a minor child and life-sustaining treatment would allow the 
individual to continue to care for the child, that individual would have 
to seek court approval before being permitted to refuse life support. The 
provision considered neither the nature of the proposed treatment nor 
the religious conviction of the individual (Hoffmann 1994, pp. 1070-71, 
n. 19). Although the term "individual" includes both men and W<>f?en, 
in fact the large majority of sole providers of minor children are 
women--often women who are suffering from HIV/AIDS . ..Thus, this 
provision had an unfair and disparate impact on women. This reality 
was broughtrto the attention of the committee by a number of public 
interest lawyers, almost aU of whom were women. 
Third, and more generally, many of the proposal's provisions 
appeared to excessively burden the family in the decision-making 
process by requiring a legalistic rather than a supportive approach to 
family relationships. The approach taken reflected a presumption that 
the state needs to protect the individual from harm in every possible sit-
uation: for example, family members would have to go to court under 
delineated conditions to prove that their ill relative would have wanted 
to discontinue life support or that doing so would be in the relative's best 
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interests (Hoffmann 1994, p. 1101). The proposal required written cer-
tification and justifications of actions by clear and convincing evidence. 
In an early draft, even artificial feeding and hydration could not be with-
held or withdrawn from an incapacitated person unless the patient had 
previously stated in writing or orally the desire not to be kept alive 
specifically by these means (Hoffmann 1994, p. 1104). Such restrictive 
language gave little or no voice to the family to act in good faith on 
behalf of a loved one. 
By December 1992, the committee decided to present the proposal to 
a broader audience, and the University of Maryland's Law and Health 
Care Program agreed to organize a conference that would include pub-
lic comment on the committee's proposal. I agreed to critique the pro-
posal at the conference. I did not ground my critique in any one partic-
ular feminist theory; in fact, my approach integrated several feminist 
perspectives. 
To put the issues in context, I started my critique with a true story. A 
week prior to the conference, a friend of mine had called me to ask for 
some advice. Her mother had suffered a massive stroke and was no 
longer able to speak. My friend could not care for her and had her 
admitted into a nursing home in Maryland. A few years previously, her 
mother had signed a standard living will form, which failed to specify 
many details, such as whether she would want artificial nutrition and 
hydration withheld or withdrawn. Neither my friend nor her mother 
knew that the form only applied to a terminal condition. Her mother 
had not gone to a lawyer to seek advice on how to fill out the form-in 
fact, her mother had never been to a lawyer in her life. My friend was 
upset because her mother had told her many times that she would not 
want to be kept alive on feeding tubes and that she did not want to. be a 
burden to the family if she could no longer care for herself. Of course, 
her mother had never written any of this down. The nursing home was 
claiming that they had no choice but to insert a feeding tube and that 
these converlations and the living will form were of no relevance. 
With this narrative as a frame of reference, I was able to ask whether 
the committee's proposal addressed concerns such as those of my friend. 
Obviously, many of the provider and consumer groups' attending the 
conference had similar stories and frustrations, and many expressed con-
cern that the proposal was too restrictive of both individual and family/ 
surrogate decision making. I argued that any proposal to legislate med-
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ical decision making should establish the presumption that family and 
friends with close relationships to the patient are best able to give voice 
to a family member or friend with limited decision-making capacity. As 
we all agreed, most individuals do nor sign advanced directives or write 
their wishes down, but that does not mean that only a court can protect 
their interests. Not having filled out a form should not mean that your 
family has no voice to act on your behalf. Rather, when a health care 
provider, institution, or the state wants w challenge the decision of a sur-
rogate, they should have the burden to petition the court, not the other 
way around. Obviously, there may be times when an individual needs 
the court's protection, but these circumstances should be regarded as the 
exception rather than the rule. In addition, I urged that the patient care 
advisory committee may serve as an alternative to the judicial process to 
mediate such matters. Clearly, the perspectives of cultural feminism 
helped to frame the deference to family decision making and the shift 
from a presumption of distrust and protectionism to one of trust and 
support of caring relationships. 
Following this analysis, I focused i:nore specifically on the gender 
implications of the proposal and its distrust of women. Not only were 
families not to be trusted, but pregnant women would not be able to 
exercise their right tO have a living will respected and sole care givers of 
minor children, the majority of whom are women, would not be able to 
terminate life-sustaining treatment without the court's approval. As a 
result, the proposal created these women differently from all other com-
petent individuals. 
Many other participants at the conference expressed significant prob-
lems with the content and approach of the committee proposal. As a 
result, a coalition was formed to draft an alternative. The coalition 
included representatives of the elderly, women's groups, an Alzheimer's 
association, and a number of medical, hospital, and legal organizations. 
As I would later testify at a hearing on the issue, the original proposal 
had ignored reality because it failed to recognize that not all feelings and 
.I 
contingencies can be codified (Hoffmann 1994, p. 1104); the alternative 
proposal was much shorter, simpler, and less legalistic. Further, the coali-
tion's alternative shifted the presumption to trusting the family, not the 
state, to make decisions. To the extent that safeguards were included, it 
was felt that they should not overly burden care givers making decisions 
for incapacitated patients. Even though some recent empirical data sug-
gest that surrogates may not make the same decisions that patients 
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would make for themselves, many individuals still prefer that their fam-
ily members, rather than physicians and judges, make these decisions 
(Hoffmann 1994, p. 1102, n. 151, 152). 
This shift in presumption to one of trust in caring relationships per-
meated the coalition proposal. The coalition proposal extended the con-
ditions under which a surrogate could make decisions to withhold or 
withdraw life support and gave a clear decision-making priority to those 
most likely to be closest to the patient (Hoffmann 1994, p. 1093). It rec-
ognized that a close friend, and not just family members, might have the 
authority to make decisions for an incompetent patient. It expanded the 
use of an oral advanced directive to include appointment of a health care 
proxy. The coalition proposal also prohibited a health care provider 
from overriding the instructions of a surrogate without first going to 
court and proving that the surrogate was not following statutory guide-
lines for decision making (Hoffmann 1994). The proposal modified the 
guardianship law to allow a guardian to authorize the withholding or 
withdrawal of life support without court approval if the patient had exe-
cuted an advanced directive, and it treated artificial feeding and hydra-
tion like other forms of life-sustaining treatment. Further, both the coali-
tion proposal and the committee's final proposal eliminated the provi-
sion that required competent individuals who were the sole care givers 
of minor children to seek court approval for termination of life-support 
decisions. Finally, and significantly, the coalition proposal did not 
include a clause restricting the right of pregnant women to have their 
advance directives followed. 
Ultimately, the Maryland Legislature considered modifications of 
both proposals. Political compromise resulted in the passage of the 
Maryland Health Care Decisions Act on May 12, 1993. The statute 
incorporated advanced directive forms that do include a section allow-
ing women to write additional instructions concerning pregnancy. -If the 
section is left blank, it is presumed that her choice of treatment will be 
the same independent of whether she is pregnant. More generally, the 
legislation ldopted the approach of the coalition proposal to presume 
trust of care givers rather than courts with a few additional safeguards 
(Hoffmann 1994, pp. 1108-30). 
This legislative approach, which shifts reliance from rbe court to the 
family, may have significant gender implications. An analysis of "right-
to-die" cases by Miles and August (1990) found asymmetric gender pat-
terned reasoning in which judges were less likely to consider evidence of 
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women's preferences with regard to life-sustaining treatment. The 
authors concluded that "the arbitrariness of gender patterned reasoning 
and its effect of these cases amply illustrates the vicissitudes of institu-
tional reasoning" (Miles and August 1990, p. 286). Thus, they suggest-
ed that courts not attempt ro construcr a person's preferences, bur rather 
empower care givers to make decisions on behalf of an incompetent fam-
ily member or friend. 
Just as significantly, the legislation rejects an approach that presumes 
that laws need to be crafted to protect: us from '4bad actors" rather than 
to support care givers. As Leslie Bender, a cultural feminist, has 
observed, "The social and ethical price of designing our laws and rules 
for the bad actors is significant suffering and indignity to innocent, 
humane people because of unnecessary restraints on their freedom to act 
out of care in a manner responsive to particularized circumstances of 
need" (Bender 1992, p. 532; Hoffmann 1994, p. 1102-3, n. 28). 
On reflection, I believe that the .Y1aryland Health Care Decisions Act 
was enriched by the integration of feminist perspectives. Although gen-
der issues were not always front and center, feminist legal theory did, in 
fact, contribute to the challenging of legal rules and presumptions. 
Obviously, the bioethical and public policy debate over the new repro-
ductive technologies, including egg donation, will also be enriched by the 
diversity of feminist legal theory. Hopefully, both lawyers and bioerhi-
cists will recognize that gender matters and will insist that "women's 
experiences, varied as they are, be taken into account" (Carbone 1994, 
p. 183). In the end this is what feminism is all about. 
I wish to thank my colleagues ]ana Singer and Diane Hoffmann for theiN_nsighrs and 
expertise, Maggie Little for her thoughtful comments and suggestions, and the other fac-
ulty and participants at the Kennedy Institute's Feminist Perspectives on Bioerhics course 
for their collaborative spirit. 
, 
NOTES 
1. See Rothenberg (1995). The analytical framework for describing the major 
feminist theories was crafted in part from the following outstanding works: 
Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations (Weisberg 1993); Feminist Legal 
Theory: Readings in Law and Gender (Bartlett and Kennedy 1991); "Gender 
Law" (Bartlett 1994), "Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories" 
(Cain 1989); and "Feminism and the Limits of Equality" (Cain 1990). 
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2. This analysis was inspired in part by an outstanding presentation by 
Rosemarie Tong at "Bioethics, Feminism and Reproductive Technology," 
AALS Annual Meeting, New Orleans, 8 January 1995. 
3. For an outstanding discussion of the evolution of the legislation, see Diane 
Hoffmann (1994). 
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